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-NOTICE.THROUGH AN AGENT.
The time worn phrase, "Notice. to an agent is notice to
the principal," suggests at *once that the courts using it in the
decision of cases have relied both upon the fictions of agency
and of notice. That they have done so may be proved by even
the most cursory examination of the cases. That, for the most
part, they have reached consistent results is a tribute to the
judicial sense of the judges who have been able to. dispense
.approximate justice, although feeling obliged to announce it in
Delphic terms. In this paper it is not proposed to attempt to
solve all the difficulties which have been accumulating since the
phrase was first coined, but to limit the inquiry, for the greater
part, to two questions: i. How far is a principal affected by
notice or knowledge which has been acquired by the agent outside the scope of his employment or before the beginning of
his agency; 2. How far. is he affected by notice or knowledge
where the agent's personal interests are adverse to those of the
principal or would be injured by a revelation of the facts. To
answer these questions it is necessary to discuss the meaning'
of the word "notice," although no attempt will be made to define it, and to ascertain a reason for its being "inputed" to the
principal. As an addendum, brief consideration will be given
to the case of a knowing principal acting through an ignorant
agent
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Notice connotes knowledge but does not necessarily mean
knowledge. There are in fact two distinct types of notice.
The first type exists where one performs an act, specified by
legal rules, by which he acquires certain rights against others,
who, for the purposes for which the act was done are treated,
in general, as having knowledge. In the second type, the only
important fact to be determined in connection with notice is
whether or not action has been taken with knowledge of certain
facts. In the first type we look at the act of the one claiming
rights under the notice; in the second, at the knowledge of the
one whose responsibility is increased because of it. This distinction is obvious in most cases, but the courts, though acting
upon it, have not made the distinction clear in the cases where
it is of especial importance, where it is sought to "impute
notice" to a principal. -Because of the essentially different
results obtained in the two types, of notice, this distinction
may be used as the basis for the division of the cases discussed
here.
I. ABSOLUTE NOTICE.
A. THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF ABSOLUTE NOTICE.

The first type of notice, which exists irrespective both of
actual knowledge and of reasonable probability of acquiring
it, is created by the performance of an act from which flow all
the legal consequences that are of importance from the present viewpoint. This performance may create rights against all
the world, against all the members of a class, or against individuals. For convenience this type may be called "absolute
notice." 1
1. Notice to a Class Irrespcctive of Individual Knowledge.
When the act has a final effect against everyone or against
everyone in a given class, no question of agency can be raised.
The typical case is that created by the statutes in regard to
registration. After the filing of the registered document, every2d

'See Wade, Notice,
Ed., p. 598.

2d

Ed., Sec. 97; Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances,
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one who is in the class of persons affected by such registered
documents is treated as if he had read it. For the purposes of
the one registering, it is immaterial whether knowledge of the
contents comes to anyone. Hence it is equally immaterial
whether a person who deals with the subject matter involved
acts personally or through an agent. He is bound in either
event, not by knowledge but by the act of registration. The
same thing is true in the typical case of notice given to a class.
Where suitable notice is given of the dissolution of a partnership, it is effective against all not having had previous dealings
with the firm whether or not they have seen the notice. 2 Of
course there may exist, also, knowledge on the part of a principal or his agent of an unrecorded deed or of the dissolution
of a partnership which may result in the same obligations as
if the deed had been recorded or the dissolution advertised, but
the result is achieved for different reasons.3

2. Notice to Individuals by Performanceof an Act Which Nornwalty Gives Them Knowledge.
The second class, of this type of "absolute "notice" exists
where, by certain acts which normally produce knowledge,
rights and liabilities may be determined against particular
persons. This situation exists in the case of bankruptcy pcoceedings, as to creditors; acceptance of guaranty in certain cases,
as to the guarantor; vacating premises, as to landlord or tenant;
limitation of the liability of carriers, as to shippers; defects in
articles, as to buyers; and in others of the same sort. Without
discussing whether any particular act is within this class,* it is
clear that the class does exist and that in all cases within it
the one giving notice does an act the iffect of which, irrespective of any knowledge being acquired by the one to be effected,
is determinative of the rights of both. There is but one ques2Davis

(Eng. 1817).

v. Keyes, 38 N. Y. 94

:868); Jenkins v. Blizard, x Stark 48

. In some states the requirement of registration is absolute and knowl-

edge of an unrecorded transfer does not create the obligations created by
recording. McDuffee v. Walker. 125 La. 552, $s So. IO0 (Igio).
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tion to be raised: Was the act done the correct one? The act
required in some of these cases may be causing the-document to
reach a place designated by the other. In other cases it is sufficient to place a properly addressed document in the hands of
the postal authorities. That this "notice" has no direct relation
to knowledge is seen not only by the fact that the results follow whether or not the one to whom the document was sent
receives it, 4 but also by the fact that to qualify as this kind of
notice, the act must be performed by the proper party.. Thus
a notice to quit given on behalf of the landlord by one who did
not have authority is ineffective.5 So also notice of the dishonor of a negotiable instrument must be given by someone
who has an interest in the bill. 6 In the case of notice given to
satisfy the terms of a contract, the only question is as to the
act required by the contract. Thus if a contract of sale provides that notice of defects must be given to the seller, it is a
matter of interpretation to hold that notice given to a local
office is not sufficient. 7 And where a bill of lading contains
directions to "notify B," the court is merely announcing the
act called for by the contract when it says that notice to B is
notice to the consignor. 8
It is true that in some of these cases knowledge will have
the same effect as if notice had been given. That is not true,
however, where the performance of a formality is a part of
the obligation assumed, as in the case of the notice required to
indorsers of negotiable instruments." In any event, subsequent
knowledge is not this kind of notice and presents problems to
be dealt with later.
'Acceptance of guaranty, Bishop v. Eaton, x61 Mass. 49!, 37 N. E. 665
(1894) ; statutory notice of a lien, Blanchard v. Ely, 179 Mass. 491, 6! N.
E. 218 (igoi); dishonor of negotiable instrument, Munn v. Baldwin, 6 Mass.
315 (xIbo).
*Doe v. Mizen, z Mood. & R. 56 (Eng. 1837).
* Godfrey v. Turnbull, I Esp. 37! (Eng. 1795) ; Graves v. Milry, 6 Cow.
7o! (N. Y. 18z7).
' Larson v. Minn. Threshing Co., 92 Minn. 62, 99 N. W. 6a3 (x9o4).
'Harding v. Chicago, etc. Ry., 134 Mo. App. 68r, 114 S. W. 1117 (1909).
'So also notice of defects in premises as against landlord, Hugall v.
McLean, s3 L. T. R. 94 (Eng. i885), semble.
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3. Notice to Individuals by Performance of an Act Which Gives
Them Knowledge.
Another class of this type exists where the one giving the
notice is required to bring home knowledge of the facts to the
one whom he wishes to effect with notice. This is true, apparently, in the case of notice of dissolution of partnership as
to those having had previous dealings with the firm.10 This
would seem to be true also in all cases where one "notifies" another of rights claimed in property or of an assignment of a
chose in action. It may be said in these cases that the one who
is sought to be affected with notice has no obligations to the

other until he has knowledge of the facts which would. disclose
an obligation to act. For instance, a creditor assigns a claim
and the assignee writes to the debtor telling him of the assignment. When the.debtor receives the letter, but before he opens
it, he may be under no obligation to the sender either to preserve or to oper it. But in these cases, as in the others of this
type, it is the giving the notice which determines the obligation; the additional element here is that the act of giving notice
must include the conveyance of the information. In England
the act of giving notice of assignments operates to create rights
against prior assignees as well as against the debtor or trustee,
something which ihe niere receipt of inforination by the creditor or trustee obviously would not accomplish. Thus in Dearle
v. Hall," Lord Lyndhurst said, "The-act of giving the trustee
notice is, in a certain degree, taking possession of the fund."
Although the Englislh rule as to the effect of notice may not
be sound, it serves to illustrate the distinction, which has important consequences when applied to the rules of agency, between the act, performed by or on behalf of the party interested,
which formally conveys the information, and the receipt of
information, which if received by the principal personally, generally has the effect of formal notice. The right to give notice
"See Austin v. Holland, 69 N. Y. 571 (1877); Kenney v. Altvator, 77
Pa. 34 (x874).
u3 Russl 48 (1").
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which has a conclusive effect from the fact of its being given
must, from its nature, be given by those whose interests are
involved and to those whose situation indicates their connection
with those interests. Thus in the cases similar to Dearle v.
Hall the notice must be given after'the trust has been created,
though the trustee may be affected personally and to a limited
12
extent by information acquired previously.
B.

EFFECT UPON THE PRINCIPAL WHERE ABSOLUTE NOTICE

Is GIVEN AN AGENT.
This question is determined by the rules controlling the
making of contracts through agents. Since in all cases of
notice of this type, the sole question upon which the validity
of the notice depends is whether or not the one relying upon
the notice did the required act, where a question of agency is
presented, the point is whether or not he directed the document
or gave the information, which is the basis of the notice, to
the one who had real or ostensible authority to receive it for
the one to be affected. If this has been done, in all cases, with
one exception subsequently noted, the principal is affected by
the notice as if he had received it personally. He is bouhd in
the same way and for the same reason that he is bound by the
contracts of his authorized agents. The third person has relied
upon the existence of the relationship. Thus where a buyer of
goods gives "notice" of defects in the goods, the notice is effectual if he has notified one who, by the custom of business or
the designation of the seller, is the one to whom notice should
be given.1 3 It is as unnecessary in these cases to say that notice
is imputed to the principal as it is to say that a principal has
notice of a contract made for him through an authorized agent.
So where a messenger is sent for goods, the disclosure of a defect
to him by the seller relieves the latter from liability to the
"Somerset v. Cox, 33 Beav. 634 (1865); The Sociiti Ginirale de Paris
v. The Tramways Union Co., 14 Q. B. D. 424 (Eng. x885).
' Hale v. Van Buren, H. & M. Co., 24 Okla. 13, 1o3 Pac. i26 (igog);
Aultman & T. Co. v. Hefner, 67 Tex. 54, 2 S. W. 86r (1886); Buckeye S.
M. Co. v. Rutherford, 65 W. Va. 395, 64 S. E. 444 (i9o9).
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buyer. 14 Surely it is unnecessary to invoke the fiction that "the
law conclusively presumes" that the messenger communicated
the information, as did the court which, upon that presumption,
found the buyer guilty of contributory negligence in taking five
grains of morphine, after a warning by the seller, a druggist,
given to the messgenger that the package sent did not contain
the morphine "in doses" as ordered. That this passion for
Baconian phrasing did not lead the court into error seems only
to have been a bit of good fortune, for in the co-ordinate reasoning upon which the decision was based, the court argued
that as it. was unlawful for the druggist to sell "doses," the
woman ought to have known they were not sent and, because
of this, was guilty of contributory negligence saying: ."No one
can be heard to claim ignorance of a public statute." 15
It is important to distinguish this type of notice where the
performance of an act creates the obligation or the tight, from
that which is dependent solely upon knowledge of some sort.
There are three principal characteristics to be noted.
First. Adverse interest or action by the agent is imnaterial, unless known to the notifier. The fact of ar adverse
interest being held by an agent to whom notice has been given
is as irrelevant as it is where an authorized contract or representation is made by an agent. In the same way that a principal is bound in that case by an agent who is acting against
his interests, he is bound by notice of this sort given to an
agent authorized to receive it, although the latter is actively
defrauding him.1 6 The.alleged rule that a principal is not
bound by notice to an agent who has an adverse interest can
not apply to this type of cases.
It would seem correct to apply this reasoning to the cases
where a bank returns cancelled checks and a statement of accounts to a depositor whose clerk had forged some of the
2' Dickerson v. Matheson. 57 Fed. 524 (1893); Conrad v. Graham, 54

103 Pac. 22 (go9).
Fowler v. Randall, 99_ Mo. App. 4o7, 73 S. W. 931 (Io).
"First Nat. Bank v. Foirth Nat. Bank, 56 Fed. 967 (1893); Walker
v. Grand Rapids F. M., 70 Wis. 92, 35 N. W. 332 (1887).

Wash. 64t,
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checks, the same clerk having authority to examine the returned
checks and accounts. Assuming that the depositor owes the
bank a duty to examine the accounts and that he can not recover from the bank if his wrongful failure to notify the bank
of the forgeries results in injury to it, it is immaterial who
makes the examination. The return of the documents by the
bank is a method of giving notice sanctioned by the parties, by
usage or agreement. The bank performs its full obligation
upon delivering to the depositor, or one authorized to act for
him, the documents in such condition that one would be enabled
by an examination of them to discover the existence of the
fact, i.e., the forgery, which it is important to discover. There
is no need of imputing knowledge of the contents to the principal, since his liability becomes fixed at a period after the
delivery which affords a reasonable time for examination. The
fact that the agent who examines the accounts is one who would
not reveal the existence of the forgeries is, then, immaterial.
This result is reached in a majority of jurisdictions.17 To relieve the principal here on the ground that his obligation *is
limited to selecting for examiners those whom he reasonably
believes to be competent and honest, if carried to its logical
result, would relieve a principal from the obligations of a contract made for him by a fraudulent agent
Of course where the one giving the notice knows or should
know that the agent to whom it is given is defrauding the principal, he can claim no more rights under it than can one contracting with an agent known to be acting adversely to his
principal. He can not take advantage of a known breach of
faith.'1 He is barred, not by the existence of an adverse interest on the part of the agent, but by his own fraud.
Second. The principal may be estopped to deny the agent's
authority to receive notice. In notice of this type, since the
"For a collection of the cases and an analysis of the decisions, see
7 L R. A. (N. S.) 744.
J Ayers v. Green Co, 116 Cal. 333, 88 Pac. 221 (1897); Brown v. Harris,
139 Mich. 372, 1o2 N. IV. 96o (i9o5); Corn. v. Standard Co., 2o Pa. xo3,

5o AtL

1003 (I902).
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principal is affected by it in the same way and to the same
extent as by a contract made by an agent, there is an opportunity for estoppel to work, so that if notice is given to one
who has apparent authority to receive it, the notice is effectual.
Were the validity of the notice based upon any presumption of
communication, or upon the identity of principal and agent, or
upon the liability of a principal for the act of his agent, this
result would be illogical. But since the notice is completed by
the doihg of an act, if one has misled another into thinking
that a certain act, i.e.; delivering the notice to the agent, will
create rights, the first is liable as if the correct act had been
done. Thus where an ostensible agent of an insurance company is notified of changed conditions, the company is bound; "1
if the same individual had acquired the information otherwise,
the company would not have been affected. The situation is
the same where the agency to receive notice had been terminated without the knowledge of the one giving it.20
Third. Notice must be given, save where estoppel works,
to an agent having authority to receive notice at the time it is
given. In this class of cases, except where estoppel works, the
notice must come to the agent in the course of his employment.
This must be true for unless the notice is so given, the one
giving it is not doing the required act, which is to direct the
letter or give the information to one who is employed to receive and act upon that particular thing. Thus information
given to the general manager of a corporation out of business
hours as to the dissolution of a partnership may give him
knowledge upon which, if he remembers it, he may be bound
to act later, but it is not such notice as from the mere fact of
its being given will bind the corporation.2 1 When the courts
quote the rule broadly given by Pomeroy, 22 that "the information constituting the notice must be obtained by or imparted to
"Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Hart, 149 IIL 513, 36 N. E. 99 (Y894).
Springfield Co. v. Kennedy. 7 Ind. App. 502, 34 N. E. (1893).
Compare Marsh, Merwin & Lemmon v. Wheeler, 77 Conn. 449, 59
AtI 410 (1904).
1 Equity Jurisprudence, 3d Ed., Sec. 67.
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the agent while he is in fact acting as agent," in connection
with cases of this type, they are correct and without the necessity of limiting it; their use of the phrase in connection with
cases involving the second type of notice, to be presently discussed, is clearly erroneous unless limited.
II. NOTICE WHICH MEANS KNOWLEDGE.
A.

LIABILITY

OF THE PRINCIPAL

AG4T

FOR THE FAILURE OF THE

TO COMMUNICATE KNOWLEDGE.

The principal is subjected to liability for the failure of the
agent to communicate knowledge, as for other wrongful acts
of the agent in the course of his duty. This second type of
notice, which exists where knowledge alone is the vital element, is distinguished from the first type in that its analogies
are found in the law of torts rather than in the rules of contract, as the liability is predicated upon fault of some sort. It
may be said generally that in all cases where fault is the basis
of liability or of a defence, knowledge is an essential element.
There are two typical cases. The first is where one having
knowledge of facts which do or should lead him to believe that
action of a certain sort on his part will physically injure another or his property, nevertheless takes such action. Cases
of this sort usually fall under the head of torts.
The second is where one knows facts which do or should
lead him to believe that he will injure the peuniary interests
of another if certain action is taken. The liability here, as
worked out by our courts, exists in a restricted range and has
been most completely developed in equity. The typical situation is created where one has received the title of property when*
he knew or should have known from the facts in his possession
that a third person- had equitable interests in the property.
Equity has given relief through the fictions of fraud and constructive trusts, but the basis of the obligation is the same as
in the tort cases; an act done by one whose knowledge makes
the act, which is in fact injurious to another, wrongful. When
a constructive trust is raised because the holder of the legal
title knew upon taking it of existing equities, the act of taking

NOTICE THROUGH AN AGENT

title is of the same nature as that which forms the basis of an
action of deceit. Where the taker of the title knew facts from
which careful men would have been led to know of the existence of the equities, his act of taking title contains the same
element of wrongdoing as that which makes one liable for
physical injuries negligently inflicted upon another and the same
as that, which upon the facts of Derry v. Peak,2 3s should form
the basis of' some legal liability. In all of these cases the obligation is the duty not to cause damage, negligently or intentionally, to the interests of another; in all of them the knowledge
of the defendant makes the act wrongful.
If a person is made responsible for injuries in both classes
of cases for the same reasons, it would seem to follow that the
liability of .a principal should be determined by the same principles in both. If a master is responsible for the negligent acts
of a servant committed in the course of employment, the acts
being negligent because of the knowledge which the servant
has, or if the principal is liable for the misrepresentations of
his agent, whose knowledge of facts made the representations
fraudulent, in the same way and to the same extent the. principal should be responsible for the act or the failure to act of an
agent who is employed to convey certain information or who
is required to act in the light of whatever information he possesses. One who employs an agent to ascertain all the facts in
regard to the ownership of property should be responsible for
the failure of the agent to report that John Doe has an equitable interest in the property, if the agent's failure to do so
results in the destruction by the principal of John Doe's interest, in the same way that he is liable if his servant fails to
warn John Doe, while a licensee upon the principal's land, of
hidden dangers not known to the principal but known to the
servant, it being the servant's duty to warn such licensees. In
the latter case it is not said that knowledge of the hidden danger
is imputed to the principal; he is made liable on the short
ground that a master is responsible for the negligent acts of
"L R. 14 App. Cas. 337 (ISfg).

12

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

his servants. And lie is liable to the licensee, although if he had
employed no servant he would have been safe, as the obligation is to disclose only known defects. In the same way one
hiring the title examiner would not have been liable if he had
employed no one, as the obligation to equitable owners is based
upon knowledge alone. The extent of the obligation and the
reasons for its imposition seem to be the same in both cases.
That the liability of the principal is based upon the general
rules of respondeat superior in cases in which the language of
notice has been used, seems clear. Lord Hardwick expressed
the reason succinctly in the leading case of Le Neva v. Le
Neve,24 in holding a principal bound by the knowledge of a
solicitor, employed to examine a title, who, for reasons of his
own, had failed to, report upon the existence of the plaintiff's
equity. "If the ground is the fraud," he said, "it is all one
whether by the party himself or by.his agent." But in spite
of the clearness of this enunciatiorr and of the manifest basis
for liability, the courts have been practically unanimous in finding it necessary to use the fiction that the principal has knowledge of the facts in order to bind him.
If the courts had used the language, as they have the logic,
of Lord Hardwick, we would not now have the discussion as
to whether "notice is imputed" to the principal because of the
identity of principal and agent, or because there is a "conclusive presumption" that the agent has done his duty.2 The first
reason assigned does not aid us; the second is valuable only
when opposed to the facts. Of course the fact that the agent
has certain knowledge may be used as evidence to show that
the principal has it, and the jury may find in many cases that
the agent has communicated. 28 But this has nothhig in common with "imputed notice"; personal knowledge on the part of
the principal may be found as easily by evidence that a close
business friend knew the facts and that the circumstances were
"Amb.436 (1747)"See Mechem. Agency 2d Ed. Sec. x8o5.
" Hall B. W. M. Co. v. Haley F. & M. Co., 174 Ala. r9o, 56 So. 726
(19r1) ; Thompson v. Central P. Ry., 8o N. J. L.328, 78 Atl. 152 (1g9o).
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such that probably he disclosed them. These matters of evidence must be distinguished from the principles of substantive
law and it is difficult to do so when the courts use the same
language for ioth.
B.

WHERE KNOWLEDGE

Is

IMPORTANT IN PHYSICAL DEALINGS

WITH PROPERTY.

The courts have used the fiction of imputed or construc-

tive notice in many cases where a principal has been sued upon
a contract or for a tort, where knowledge was important, as
well as in cases where it was sought to hold him as a trustee
of property because receiving it with knowledge of the rights
of third persons in it. There is no reason why it should not
be used in one as well as in the other, but there is less apparent
excuse for it in the former dass and a few of those cases will
be considered before proceeding to the latter type.
It is said, for instance, that the knowledge of a servant
that an animal has vicious propensities is imputed to the master,
who thereupon is made liable for injuries done by the animal.27
Of course the court is imposing liability because of the act of
the servant in the control of the animal, just as it makes the
master liable for the negligent control of non-vicious animals.
The difference lies wholly in the law of torts. So also where
an employee discovers a defect in the plant or apparatus of the
employer, the latter is subjected to liability because the employee having some supervision of the property has failed to
take such action, either by repairing it or calling the attention
of others to it, as will normally prevent injury to third persons 28 or to fellow workmen. 2 9 To say, as do the courts in
these cases, that knowledge is imputed, is to infer that there
exists a distinct rule for the solution of thise cases apart from
Brown v. Green, i Pennewill 535, 42 Atl. 991 (i8go) ; O'Neill v. Blase,

94 Mo. App. 648, 68 S. W. 764 (i9o2); Lynch v. Kineth, 36 Wash. 368, 78
Pac. 923 (19o4).
City of Denver v. Sperret, 88 Fed. 228 (1&8); Alexandria M. & Z.

Co. v. Irish, i6 Ind. App. 534, 44 N. E. 68o (1896); Barres v. Louisville

Electric Co, 1x8 Ky. 830, 85 S. W. 1186 (igo5).
I Baldwin v. Ry., 75 Ia. 297, 39 N. W. 507 (1888); Indiana, etc. Rwy.
v. Snyder, 14o Ind. 647, 39 N. E. 912 (1895); Lingreen v. Williams Bros.
Co., 11-2 Minn. 86, 127 N. W. 626 (1910).
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the normal responsibility of the master. The same comment
applies to other cases of the same sort: where a servant knows
of a situation dangerous to others and there is an obligation
upon the master that his servants shall use care after such
knowledge;30 where a railroad fails in its qualified obligation
to have its servants protect passengers;31 or where a bailee's
servants do not use care in the protection of bailed goods.3 2
In such eases it scarcely needs argument to make it clear that
it is immaterial how or when the servant or agent acquired the
information which raises the obligation; the only question is
one of negligence which must be deteimined by the nature of
the act in view of the total information possessed at the time.
Occasionally, however, the courts will confuse this situation
with that existing after "absolute" notice has been given, and
hold that a principal is bound only where the knowledge is received by the agent in the course .of his employment. 83 . Most
of these cases can be rested upon the ground that there was
in fact no obligation upon the agent to act or to make disclosure,
in which event there was no wrongful act.3 '
It would seem to be clear, also, that an adverse interest
held by the agent relieves the principal only as it does in the
case of all torts committed by the agent. A New Jersey court,
however, leads us into the scenes of Alice in Wonderland in
reaching a result which, nevertheless, is correct, -as the agent was
acting during the whole transaction for his own purposes only."
The defendant's superintendent, unauthorized and for the purpose of taking the action subsequently taken, gave to the plaintiff some of the company's property. Later, in the name of the
company, he instituted a criminal prosecution, alleging a theftCin., etc. Rwy. v. Kassen, 49 Ohio St. 230, 31 N. E. 282 (1891).
K. & T. Rwy. v. Raney, 44 Tex. Civ. App. S17, 99 S. W. 58g
(19o7); Wheeler v. Grand Trunk Rv.. 70 N. H. 6o 7 . ro AtM xo3 (i9oi).
"H. A. Johnson v. Springfield Ice Co., 143 Mo. App. 44r, z27 -S. W.
692 (191o).
4o (igir).
IGoodwin v. Tel. Co., 157 Mo. App. 596, 138 S. W
3,Tate v. Ill. Cent. Rwy., 26 Ky. L R. 3o9, 81 S. W. A6 (i9o4); Price .
"Mo.

Oregon, 47 Or. 350, 83 Pac. 843 (19o6).
" Hartdown v. Webb. Mfg. Co., 75 Atl. 893 (N. J. igio).
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of the "gift." In the subsequent action for malicious prosecution, the court redsoned that the superintendent, as superintendent did not know that he had given the property away; that
knowledge was held only by him, the man. But the superintendent did know that the plaintiff had the property, and this
knowledge alone being imputed to the company, the latter had

reasonable grounds for instituting the action. The method of
reasoning leaves us wondering how the wicked individual was
able to conceal from the virtuous superintendent his load of sin.
C. WHERE THE PRINCIPAL ACQUIRES PROPERTY IN WHICH
THERE ARE PRIOR EQUITABLE RIGHTS.

Coming now to the cases where one acquires paroperty in
which there are prior equitable rights that can be retained only
if there is no. fault in the acquisition, or where a contract is
made which would be voidable if made with a knowledge of
certain facts, it would seem that the situation is essentially the
same. If the agent's duty is to act, he commits the fault by
not acting or by acting wrongly; if his duty is to reveal, he is
guilty of the same wrong in remaining silent, as that of a car
inspector who fails to report defective equipment. The great
majority of cases reach results consistent with this reasoning.
For the purpose of considering how far the courts have departed from it through the use of formulae, it is convenient to
divide the cases into two classes: I. Where the agent having
the knowledge, accepted on behalf of the principal, the title to
property, or makes the contract through which the principal
claims; 2. Where the contract is made or the property acquired by the principal or by another agent, who does not know
the facts which, if known would place the principal at fault in
acting.
1. Where the Agent Having the Knowledge Alone Acted for
the Principal.
In the first place the time and manner of acquisition of
the knowledge is immaterial. It is held almost uniformly that
the principal takes subject to the equities known to the agent,
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whenever or however the information is acquired,3 6 even in
jurisdictions where, in cases included in the second class above,
it is held that the principal is not bound by information acquired
by the agent prior to the beginning of the agency.3 7 Personal
interests and motives of the agent are immaterial, though the
same unanimity of opinion does not prevail where the nature
of the transaction was such that the probability of the agent's
revealing the facts was slight.
These cases, in which the agent was the sole actor for the
principal, may be classified as follows:
First. Where the agent obtained from a third person a
title or a contract running directly to his principal, by fraud or
with knowledge of the equities of others. If it is found that the
agent was acting throughout the transaction in the general
interests of his employer, all the courts are agreed that the
principal can not hold the property or bring an action upon
the contract without being subjected to the equitable obligation. He cannot accept the benefit of the agent's act without
also accepting the incidents, and this, too, irrespective of whether
the "agent" was originally authorized.38 But where it was
clear that the agent had interests adverse to those of his principal, some of the courts upon the ground that "the rule of notice
is based upon the presumption that the agent will communicate
and that this presumption does not exist where the agent is
committing a fraud," have not subjected the principal to liability.39 Others have reached this result by invoking the rule,
"When an agent abandons the object of his agency and
"Lockhar v. Wash. G. & S. M..Co, 16 N. M. 223, 17 Pac. 833 (i91i);
Argentine Min. Co. v. Benedict, 18 Utah 183, 56 Pac. ss (I898); Hyman
v. Barmon. 6-Wash. 516..33 Pac. lO76 (1803).
"In Re Heckman's Estate, 172 Pa. 185, 33 AtL 552 (1896); Fire Assn.
v. L. G. & L.C. Co.. so Tex. Civ. Ap. 172. 100 S. W. 1134 (19o8). Contra:

Vulvan Detinning Co. v. Am. Can Co, 72 N. J. Eq. 387, 67 Atl. 339 (1907),
based upon the peculiar New Jersey rule, and overruling the language of the
court in 7o N. J. Eq. 588, 6z Atl. 881, although reaching the same result.
I Bodine v. Berg, 82 N. J. L. 662, 82 At. goi (1912) ; Bennett v. Judson.
21 N. Y. 238 (t86o); Saratoga Inv. Co. v. Kern, 148 Pac. 1125 (Or. I915) ;
Hughes v. Settle. 36 S. W. 577 (Tenn. i895); Cassiday F. B. & L Co. v.

Terry, 69 W. Va. 572, 73 S. B. 278 (1912).

Gunster v. Scranton, L. H. & P. Co.. z8r Pa. 327. 37 At!. 55o (1897).
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acts for himself by committing a fraud for his own exclusive
benefit, he ceases to act within the scope of his employment and
to that extent ceases to act as agent." 40 Thus for one of these
reasons or a combination thereof, the knowledge of the agent
did not have the effect of affecting the rights of the principal,
where the agent bought property for his principal to whom he
had guaranteed the title; 41 where anf agent to buy land was
defrauding both his principal and the seller; 42 and where an
agent obtained fraudently a note run'ning to his principal, personally discounted the note of his principal's bank and used the
43
proceeds.
But, conceding for the present that the rules as stated by
these courts exist, they are misapplied. For if the act of the
agent who had the information was the sole act by which the
property was acquired, or if he alone represented tbe principal
in making the contract, the principal has to rely upon the consciousness of his "extended personality" in order to have any
effect given to the transaction, and this consciousness can not
be divided. The situation is the same as that where a cestui
que trust is prevented from succeeding because of the fraud of
the trustee; he is barred because of the necessity of tracing his
title through the one acting for him. It was said in Loring v.
Brodie: 44 "If Fuller was the instrument of Brodie in committing a fraud on the bank by unlawfully transferring to it
the securities of another, whether he concealed the fact or not,
the bank could not take the securities from his hands .or hold
them in its custody, except -with the knowledge he had.' The
only authority the bank could have to hold or sell them was
under the contract made by or through Fuller, the cashier."
Or, to use the vigorous expression of Judge Lamm in Thoinpson v. Lindsay; 45 "The eye of equity can not see her (the
- Henry v. Allen, 5i N. Y. Y, 45 N. E. 355 (A896).

" Smith

v. Boyd, 162 Mo. 146, 6z S. W. 439 (T9o0).

I Cole v. Getzinger, (fi Wis. 559, 71 N. W. 75 (1897).
"Lanning v. Johnson, 75 N. J. L. 259, 69 Atl. 490 (19O8).
"134 Mass. 453 (1883).

"242 Mo..5.

14.5
S. W. 472 (1)12).
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principal) without seeing him (the agent). It must look
through him to see her at all." If in fact it is the mind of
the agent that consents and if that mind is fraudulent, it is
difficult to understand how the innocence of the principal's
mind can relieve him. The argument that the fraudulent agent
might have carried on the transaction through other agents or
through the principal himself, 40 is beside the point, for in that
event it would not have been necessary to make the claim
through the "knowing" agent. Though it is difficult to say on
which side stands that idol of American law students, "the
weight of authority," there is, at least respectable authority in
accord with the view here expressed.4 Some of the cases cited
as being contra may be placed upon the ground that the defrauded party placed in the hands of the agent the means of
injuring the principal or should have known that the agent Was
48
acting adversely.
Sccond. Where an agent acquires property fraudulently or
steals property the title to which passes upon change of possession, and transfers it to his principal, the courts are nearly
unanimous in holding that the property cannot be retained if
the .facts make it ratiofial to apply the rule that where one
commits a fraud in doing an act which inures to the benefit of
another, the one accepting the benefit becomes liable for the
fraud. This is the rule where a defaulting treasurer obtains
money from another company which he uses to replace the
amount of his defalcations and for the purpose of concealing
them; 49 or where a note is obtained for the same purpose; 5 0
First Nat. Bk. v. Northrup, 82 Kan. 638, to9 Pac. 672 (xgio).
"Tatum v. Commercial Bk. & Tr. Co., 6j So. qo8 (Ala. i9iS);
Fouchi v. Merchants' Nat. Bk., zto Ga. 827, 36 S. E. 256 (i9oo); Taylor
v. Felder, 3 Ga. App. 287, 59 S. E. 844 (19o7); Loring v. Brodie (supra);
Berry v. Rood. i68 Mo.-.3Ii. 67 S. W. 6.14 (19o2). See also the result in
Aldrich v. Chemical Nat. Bk.. 176 U. S. 618 (igoo).
"Fort Dearborn Nat. Bk. v. Seymour, 71 Minn. 1ooo, 73 N. W. 724
(x898) ; First Nat. Bk. of Nephi v. Foote, 12 Utah 157, 42 Pac. 20S (1895).
"Fairfield v. Southport M. Bk., 8D Conn. 9, 67 Atl. 471 (i9o7) ; Atlantic
C. M. v. Ind. 0. M., 147 Mass. 268, 17 N. E. 496 (x888); Newell v. Hadley,
2o6 Mass. 335, 92 N. E. 5o (igo).
"Skud v. Tillinghast, i9s Fed. i (1912).
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or notes or bonds are issued without authority and the principal retains the proceeds;51 or the frauds of another company are used by a baik officer for the benefit of the bank.8 2
In the case of an insolvent and defaulting agent who replaces,
in fraud of his other creditors, the amount of his defalcation,
a different result has been reached.13 Where the principal is
not seeking to enforce an obligation, the result should be reached
upon the ground of unjust enrichment; 5 4 if he is enforcing a
claim, he is barred by the knowledge of the agent
Third. Where a bank officer deposits in his bank money or
notes to which he has fraudulently obtained title, the deposit
being for the purpose of concealing or realizing upon his fraud,
and later witbdraws the funds, if the deposit is made through
another agent the situation is the same as where an agent sells
to the principal. But where the transactioh is wholly completed through the fraudulent agent, the principal has to trace
his title through the consenting mind of the agent, just as he
does where the property is conveyed directly from the third
person. In the case of a note discounted, the analogy-seems
perfect and the principal is affected by the equities, irrespective
of the fact that the result of. the transaction will -be injurious
to him'.55 In the case of a cash deposit, if it is assumed that
the agent has authority to receive his own money under all
conditions, a debtor and creditor relationship is established,
which is affected by the trust as the one establishing it had the
guilty knowledge, and when the funds are subsequently drawn
UBannatyne v. MacIver (igo6),
I K B. 1o3; Ditty v. Dor. Nat. Bk,
75 Fed. 769 (896); Washington A. V. M_ V. Rwy. v. 1;. S. Tr. Co, 17
Fed. 3o6 (191o).
IFarmers & T. Bk. v. K. M. Co., x S. D. 388, 47 N. I.'4o2 (i8go).
"Lindsay v. Lambert Bldg. & L. Assn., 4 Fed. 48 (i88o); High v.
Opalite Tile Co., 184 Fed. 45o (911).
" This is clearly pointed out by Shaw, C. J., in Atlantic Bk. v. Merchants'
Bk., io Gray 532 (Mass. (1858).
"*First Nat. Bk. v. Blake, 6o Fed. 78 (894); First Nat. Bk. v. Babbidge, i6o Mass. 563, 36 N. E. 462 (1894), sembli; Le Duc v. Moore, xxx
N. C. 516, is S. E. 888 (1892) ; First Nat. Bk. v. Burns, 88 Ohio 434, 103 N.
W. 93 (1913); Contra: In Re European Bank, 5 Ch. App. 358 (1870),
.remble; Hummel v. Bk. of Monroe, 75 Ia. 689, 37 N. W. 9S4 (1888);
Indian Head Nat. Bk. v. Clark, 166 Mass. 27, 43 N. . 912 (x896).
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out through tihe same person, this withdrawal will not constitute payment as against the defrauded person.5 6 But in this
case the bank is not required to take affirmative action nor
obliged to claim that it received title. it may be said that the
bank was a mere conduit pipe and that the agent retained a
de facto control over the money. It seems fair to regard the
bank as a mere safe deposit box and to ignore the fact that the
specific money paid in was not returned. Upon this ground the
cases denying remedy against the bank may be supported."7
The cases involving noti:e to corporations are somewhat
confused because of the varying ideas as to the authority of
corporate officers. The cases cited above show, however, that
the courts make a sharp distinction between the knowledge of
those officers that are effective in making the agreement or
acquiring the property for the company and those that are not
active in the transaction. In general, as to the former, there
being no necessity of "imputing notice," the corporation is liable,
although its officers had a personal interest to conceal or were
the officers of the company selling and, as such knew the facts."'
The chief difficulty is in determining whether the officer with
9
knowledge was an effective cause of the transfer.t
2. Where the. Acquisition of Title Was Not Through the Agent
Having Knowledge.
The next class of cases, where the obtaining of the title
or the making of the contract was not the act of the agent
having the knowledge requires further subdivisions, these being made with no idea of making a logical arrangement but for
the purpose of explaining the results reached. In these sub.
"In Re Plankington Bk., 87 Wis. 378, 58 N. W. 784 (z894).
"School Dist. v. De Weese, xoo'Fed. 7o5 (,igoo); Brookhouse v. Pub.
Co., 73 N. H. 368, 62 At. 219 (19o5), semble; Bienstock v. Ammidon, z55 N.
Y. 47, 49 N. E. 321 (1898); Newell v. Hadley, 2o6 Mass. 3M, 92 N. F.

507 (191o).
"In addition to cases previously cited see: Louisville & N. Rwy. v..
Central Ky. Tr. Co., 147 Ky. 513, 144 S. W. 739 (1912); Vandagrift v. Bates
Cty. Inv. Co., 128 S. W. loOT (Mo. App. igio); First Nat. Bk. v. Erickson,
2o Neb. .80,3X N. W. 387 (887).
See: Hughes v. Settle, 36 S. W. 577 (Tenn. 895).
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divisions, the third and fourth exclude the cases included in the
first two.
First. Where the agent's knowledge has given an advantage to the 'principal, the latter is affected by the knowledge.
A principal cannot accept the benefit without also accepting the
knowledge thatgave rise to it. Assuming that the knowledge
is such that the agent either should communicate or refuse to
act at all, it becomes a fraud on the part of the agent to act
and to refrain from giving the information. If the principal
benefits by the fraud, he must surrender- the benefits. :This is perhaps best exampled in the case of a preference before bankruptcy. Without the knewledge held by the agent who engineers the transaction, of the insolvency of the debtor, it 'may
be assumed as a fact that the transfer of the property would
not have- been made. If this appears it is, therefore, immaterial when or how the agent acquired the information, 0 even
in a jurisdiction, where, in other cases, a principal is not affected
by knowledge obtained before the agency- began.6 1 Even in
the extreme case where the information was acquired through
confidential communications, the principal cannot retain the
property.6 2 Of course it is unimportant that the agent once
had the information if it is not an operating cause at the time
of the transfer, as where he had -forgotten.6 3 The rule as applied to notice is simply a branch of that general one which
will not. allow a principal to profit by the fraud of the one
acting for him, whether or not the act was previously authorized.6 4
Second. Where the "agent" with knowledge is a transferor,
his knowledge does not affect the principal. Cases of this class
do not rightly belong in this discussion but are inserted on account of the misleading language of the courts in dealing with

Co.,

"Rogers v. Palmer, io2 U. S. 263 (i88o); Nisbit v. Macon Bk. & Tr.
12 Fed. 686 (882).
'Wright
"Brown
"Taylor
'Veazie

v. Hooker, SS Tex. Civ. App. 47, 1x8 S. W. 765 ( 9o9).
v. Jefferson Cty. Bk., 9 Fed. 258 (z88k).
v. Evans, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 409, 41 S. W. 877 (1897).
v. Williams, 8 How. 134 (i85o); Bodine v. Berg, 82 N. J. L.
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them, and because such cases are often cited as authority for
the alleged rule that a principal is not affected by the knowledge of an agent when the latter has adverse interests. The
cases are unanimous in holding the principal not bound by theknowledge of the agent. 65 The result is correct beyond question. An agent is one who acts in transactions between the
principal and third persons. When an "agent" deals with his
"principal" for his own benefit and this is understood between
them, he is an adverse party. He is rightly acting for himself and not for his principal, which is exactly what an
agent cannot do. He may be an agent in other transactions;
he may even be employed as an agent to investigate the title of
the property he is selling to the principal. In this case he becomes an agent for the purpose through such special employment, but it is not as such agent that he sells. The obligation
imposed upon him as a fiduciary to reveal pertinent facts in
regard to the property, a duty existing upon all of that class,
is placed upon him personally as a seller and. not as an agent.
It is therefore unnecessary to say that "notice is not imputed"
to the principal because of an adverse interest of. the principal.66 The principal is not bound by the knowledge of the
seller because the latter is not his agent in the sale. For this
reason, where there was no question raised as to the liability
of the "principal," where a president of a bank received as an
individual, money to deposit in his bank in the name of the
donee, it was held that his knowledge could not be imputed to
662, 82 At. 91 (T912); Hughes v. Settle, 36 S. W. 577 (Tenn. i895).
oThomson-Houston El. Co. v. C. H. El. Co., s6 Fed. 844 (1893); Is Re
Senoia D. M., 193 Fed. 711 (1912); Ga. Milk P. Assn. v. Crane, 137 Ga.
50, 72 S. E. 4i4 (rgzi) ; Seaverns v. Hospital, 173 IlL 4T4, So N. E. zo79
(z898); J. T. Moore P. Co. v. M. L Tr. & S. Co, 126 La. 84o,3 So.
(igio); Innerarity v. Merchants' Nat. Bk., 139 Mass. 33A, I . E. 22
(1885); State Say. Bk. v. Montgomery, x26 Mich. 327, 85 N. W. 879 (19o);
Exchange Bk. v. Neb. U. I. Co., 84 Neb. zio, i2o N. W. 1oo (x9o);
Barnes v. Trenton Gas Light Co., 27 N. J.Eq. 33 (876); Commercial Bk.
v, Burgwyn, 11o N. C. 267, 14 S. E. 623 (1892); Baker v. Berry Hill M. S.
Co., r12 Va. 280, 71 !,. E. 626 (i9gz).
"As in: First Nat. Bk. v. Persall, hxo Minn. 333, 12S N. W. 675
(igro); First Nat. Bk. v. Lovitt, 21 S. W. 825 (Mo. 1893); Graham v.

Orange Cty. Nat. Bk., 59 N. J. L 22& 35 Ati.
Elliott & Co., x3 Va. 6x8, 75 S. E. 146 (xgs2).

(896);
5o Lee v. R. IL
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the bank so as to make the attempted gift complete.67 The same
reasoning applies where the "agent" acted in the transaction
solely for another principal. Here there is even less opportunity for holding the buyer, for the agent might be committing
a breach of duty to the seller in commuhicating the facts. This
takes care of the numerous cases where there are mutual officers
of two corporations one buying from the other, in which the
officers of the selling company act for it and not the buyer. 68
Third. Where the principal has received no benefit from
the knowledge of the agent, who is, not a transferor, the principal is affected by knowledge posiessed by the agent at. the
time of the transaction, irrespetive of the time when knowledge was acquired, if there is an obligation to disclose. If the
principal is not bound save where "the notice is given or the
information is acquired during the course of the transaction
in *which knowledge'is sought to be imputed," (a favorite expression of the courts), it must be conceded that the difference
between this type of notice and that first dealt with is of no
practical importance. It would seem fair, also, to agree that,
if this is so, there is a doctrine of "imputed notice," which
exists aside from the liability of a principal for the acts of his
agent. "Absolute notice"- ir- order to be effective, as before
pointed out, must come to one who, for the purpose of receiving
the notice, represents the principal. And it is true that, normally,
knowledge acquired by an agent in the performance of his
duties will be considered for all purposes as if the knowledge
had been acquired by the principal. But it should not be made
an exclusive test when it is sought to hold the principal because
his agent has acted or failed to act in a manner which is wrongful because the agent has the information. Knowledge is simply
the content of the individual mind and the mind of the agent
Organized Charities i. Mansfield, 82 Conn.

3o4,

74 At. 78! (igo9).

"In Re Marseilles Rwy., L. R. 7 Ch. App. x61 (i87i); Waynesville
Nat. Bk. v. Irons, 8 Fed. R. 1 (1881); Cocoran v. Snow Cattle Co, r5t
Mass. 74, 23 N. E. 727 (i&8o); Produce Ex. Bk. v. Bieberbach, x76 Mass.
577, 58 N. E. 162 (goo); First Nat. Bk. v. Christopher, 4o. N. J. L. 435
(1878); Am. Nat. Bk. v. Ritz, 70 W. Va. 409, 74 S. E. 679 (1912). See
also In Re David Payne & Co., Ltd. (1904), 2 Ch. 6o8.
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cannot be kept distinct from that of the man. 9 When we wish
to know if the engineer of a train was negligent- and it is discovered that he knew of an obstruction on the irack, it is not
necessary to find that he acquired the knowledge while acting
in the course of duty. If we are measuring the water in a
barrel, we do not care how it got there, though when our only
information is as to the amount poured in, we are properly
concerned with the question of leakage.
Of course the rule above quoted originated in the well
known tendency of the human mind to leak knowledge. In
Warrick v. Warrick,"0 Lord Hardwick, in holding a 1rincipal
not affected by the knowledge of his solicitor acquired before
the transaction in question, says: "It is very probable that
Hawkins might have forgotten it in this length of titte." And
it is conceivable that as a matter of policy and to *settle all
questions definitely, it may be better to assume in all cases that
information which the agent had received in a different transaction has been forgotten. The decisions of the few jurisdictions " which consistently reach this result might be sustained
on the ground of the convenience of certainty, were it not that
the results are opposed to our sense of justice in the great majority of cases. The New Jersey rule, which limits the liability
of the principal to that knowledge which he would have acquired had he performed the acts personally, 72 may be defended
as a bit of judicial legislation, on the ground that the public
policy, which dictates the general rule as to the liability, does
not apply to these cases.
These jurisdictions frankly disavow the ordinary rules of
liability in their entirety, however much misconception may
"Even the Alabama court concedes this: Lea v. Iron Belt Mercantile
147 Ala. 421, 42 So. 415 (x9o6).
"3 Atkyns 29r (Eng. x745).
'Hall & B. W. W. M. Co., 147 Ala. 421, 42 So. 415 (19o6); Houseman
v. Girard Mutital B. & L Assn., 81 Pa. 256 (I8-6) ; Barbour v. Wiehle, I6
Pa. 308, 9 Atl. 52o (1887); Grayson Cty. Nat. Bk. v. Hall, 91 S. W. 8o7
(Tex. i9o7); Samuelson v. Gale Mfg. Co., i Neb. (unof.) 815, 59 N. W.
Co.,

80g (igoi), semble. (?)
"Willard v. Denise. so N. J. Eq.

482, 26

Atl. 29 (8.3).
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have caused the departure.

But in the other states, the rule is

given that the principal is bound only by that knowledge coming to the agent during the agency, but "if the knowledge has
come to the agerrt so close to the transaction in question and
so definite that the agent must have it in mind when dealing
for the principal," the latter is bound.73 As pointed out in The
Distilled Spirits,74 "this is really an abandonment of the principle on which the distinction is founded." The limitation
makes innocuous the error of the first portion; the principal is
in fact bound by all the knowledge held by the agent at the
time when his duty to act arises. But the dead line created
by the court does not have that necessity for its existence which
justifies, for example, the "look and listen" rule. Aside from the
fact that there is too much variation in the attendant circumstances of the situations to make successful the use of this type
of legal presuniption, the negative phrasing leads to misunderstandings. Thus in some jurisdictions we find the court announcing in dicta the quoted rule as unqualified,75 though other
cases in the same jurisdictions show that the limitation exists
as vigorously there as elsewhere.
Furthermore, it creates c.nfusion between "absolute notice" and that based upon knowledge. Thus it was said in The
DistilledSpirits, where knowledge alone was important; "knowledge communicated to the principal he is bound to recollect,
but he is not bound by knowledge communicated to the agent
unless it is present at the time of the transaction of which clear
and satisfactory proof is required." But when Justice Bradley
said that the principal is bound to recollect knowledge communicated to him, he was obviously refering to absolute notice; 7,
if this absolute notice is given either to the principal or an agent
acting for him, the principal is bound irrespective of his later
" Compare Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 3d Ed., Sec. 672.
WalL 356 (187o).
" Penfield Inv. Co. v. Bruce, 132 Mo. App. 257, 11! S. W. 888 (i9o8);
Neilson v. Weber, 1o7 Tenn. 16x, 64 S. W. 20 (igor); Pacific Mfg. Co. v.
Brown, 8 Wash. 347 (1894).
" So also Mechem's statement to the same effect: Mechem, Agency, 2d
Uxi

Ed., Sec. i8og.
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lack of memory. Thus where a notice of an assignment of an
equitable interest is given to the trustee, this is effective ten
years later, although in the mean time the trustee has forgotten.7" But in the case of rights based solely upon knowledge,
the "duty to remember" can arise only after the knowledge hasbeen received and the possibility of its being forgotten exists,
i.e., when the later transaction arises in which the knowledge
is important. T8 For instance, suppose in Armstrong v. Abbott,7 9 where all the officers of a company had witnessed an
unrecorded deed of land, purchased by the company at a much
later time, the land had been bought by one of the officers for
himself. Clearly he would not be bound by notice since there
was no reason for him to burden his mind, as a witness to the
conveyance, with the fact that such a conveyance had been made.
The same is true of other cases where the-courts have held that
a sufficient length of time had elapsed so that "knowledge could
not be imputed." 80
But the time and manner of acquisition of knowledge may
in fact be important The lapse of time between the acquisition
of the knowledge by the agent and the time when he is called
upon" to act is, however, of no more importance here than in
all other cases where. knowledge is the fact to be proved. As
a matter of proof, it is important to know whether the agent
required the knowledge casually or during the course of business. Information casually acquired is easily forgotten. This
is true especially where the one receiving it has no reason to
suppose at the time that it is important to remember it, either
"Burrowes v. Lock, io Ves. Jr. 47o (i8o5).
"Even where there may be some duty to remember, there is not the
absolute obligation that exists after "absolute notice" has been given.
In Sociiti Gizrale de Paris v. The Tramways Union, 14 Q. B. D. 424
(1884), a notice of assignment of shares had been given the officers of a
company, but an act of Parliament prevented the rule of Dearle v. Hal
from applying. Cotton, L. J., at p. 448, says that the notice was "effectual
only for . . . the time during which it must be presumed that the facts

-remained present in tfie minds of the directors."
" 11 Col. 220, 17 Pac. 517 (1888).
.Guaranty Trust Co. v. Koehler, T95 Fed. 669 (191z); Stennett v.
Pa. F. Ins. Co., 68 Ia. 674, 28 N. W. 1z (1886) ; -Burt6h v. Perry. 146 IlL
71, 34 N. E. 6o (i893).
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from his individual standpoint or from that of his principal's.
For instance, a director in a bank learns on the street that
certain notes have been obtained by fraud. Unless he had a
prospective interest in them, he would remember the-fact hardly
longer than the time used in telling it. If the same notes are
presenfed at the bank subsequently and vot d upon at a meeting at which he is present, there is nothing to show that the
knowledge is present in his mind. As the burden of proof is
on the one seeking to show knowledge,"' proof. that the agent
once had the knowledge is not in itself sufficieit. -On the other
hand, if the information was given to the director as an officer
of the bank, so that it would not purchase the paper, assuming
this would not be absolute notice, there would be additional
facts here to show that the director retained the information at
the subsequent discounting. This distinction may. explain many
cases where the principal was not affected by the knowledge
s2
which was acquired during the private transactions of the agenL
The method and time of acquisition are important also to
determine vhether the agent had the duty to communicate, for
without this duty there is no fault on the part of anyone and
no basis for charging the principal. If the agent acquired casually, or otherwise, for that matter, information which does
not seem relevant to his principal's business, there is no duty
to act. Thu?, where an agent buying horses knows that a
certain one has a defect and at the same time the defendant
sells that horse to the principal, representing that there are no
defects, the principal is not affected by the knowledge which
the agent had no reason to communicate as he did not know
ss
that the'principal was proposing to buy the horseA Or suppose a note teller in a bank learns that a firm in which Adams
is a member has been dissolved and that afternoon another teller
' Constant v. Uni. of Rochester, 133 N. Y. 640, 31 N. -. 26 (i_n);
Kirklin v. Atlas S. & L. Assn., 60 S. W. x49 (Tenn. i9o7).
"Patterson v. Irwin, 142 Ala. 1oT, 38 So. x2 (igos); Denton Nat. Bk.
v. Kenney, 1x6 Md. 24, 81 At. 227 (igix); Shaffer v. M. M. I. Co., 17 Ind.
App. 204, 46 N. E. 557 (1897); Wash. Nat. Bk. v. Pierce, 6 Wash. 491, 33
Pac. 972 (1893).
0 See Lee v. Tarplin, z83 Mass. S, 66 N. E. 43o (1903).
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in the bank discounts a note of the dissolved firm. The bank
would be able to hold Adams, though if the first teller had
known that the bank was doing business with the firm or was
about- to take its paper, or if Adams had notified the teller,
qua teller the result *ould have been different.8 4 In all cases,
then, where the agent knows facts which are relevant to the
transaction, but which he has no reason to suppose should be
disclosed, there is no obligation upon him to speak and, therefore, no breach of duty for which the principal can be held
responsible," involved in his failure to disclose.
Again, where the information has been acquired through
confidential communications, there is a positive obligation not
to disclose. Lord Hardwick undoubtedly had this in mind in
Warrick v. Warrick. The agent or solicitor has no right to use
information confidentially, for any purpose save that for which
it was given. If he cannot use it for his benefit or for the
benefit of the one who subsequently becomes his principal, it
would seem that -there should be a corresponding right not to
have the knowledge operate to his detriment. For all subsequent purposes, it should be treated as non-existent and there
is, therefore, no duty to reveal.8 6 This is true even in the case
of a preference, where the preference is not obtained because
the agent did in fact have the knowledge."
In illustration of the general principle, it may be worth
while to notice, also, the cases where a principal is held liable
because his agent did not have the information he should have
had. Here the principal is held for the neglect of his agent
in the same manner as for the neglect of the agent to
""It would be a burden upon the bank to hold that all its officers must'
anticipate the offer to the bank of all doubtful paper of which he (a
director) might have knowledge:' Thompson v. Village of Mecosta, 141
Mich. 175, io4 N. W. 694 (19o5). See also Curtice v. Crawford Cty. Bk,
118 Fed. 390o (o2).
0Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Flemming, 65 Ark. 54, 44 S. W. 464 (1898);
Victor v. Spalding, i99 Mass. s2, 84 N.E. soi6 (igog); Casco Nat. Bk.
v. Clark, z39 N. Y. 307, 34 N. E. 9o8 (1893)*Roderick v. McMeekin, 24o IlL 625, 68 N. E. 473 (1903); Mack v.
McIntosh, 181 11. 633, 54 N. F_. 019 (i8ft).
' Downer v. Porter, 116 Ky. 422, 76 S. W. 136 (i9o3); Akers Y. Rowan,
3 S. C. 451, 12 S. F. 165 (189D).
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communicate known facts. If the failure to acquire the information was a failure by the agent in the performance of his
duties, the prineipal is liable. For instance, if an attorney, upon
looking at a deed, should know that its wording indicates a fraud
upon a third person, his failure to note that fact will subject his
principal to the same liability as if he had noticed it and communicated it to the principal.18

But if the failure to acquire

the information is the failure of an individual and not of the
defendant's agent, the latter is not bound. Thus, where a bank
director is also president of another company and, as such, should
have acquired certain information, the bank is not affected unless
its director did have the information, 9 though in actions in
which the agent is a party, the agent may be treated as if he
knew.90 For the same reason, a principal is not liable for the
failure of a sub-agent to give information to the agent, 1 nor is
he affected by the knowledge held by the partner of his agent.9 2
In these cases the agent has committed no breach of duty.
Discarding. then, the fictions and presumptions, it appears
from the results of the cases that the principal is charged with
the knowledge of all facts which it is the agent's duty to com93
municate, *irrespective of the time and manner of acquisition.
It is surplusage to add that the agent is not bound to disclose
facts which he has forgotten, when there ias no duty to remember, nor those which he had no reason to suppose were
"Kennedy v. Greene, 3 My. & K. 699 (1834).

"Mann v. Second Nat. Bk., 34 Kan. 746, io Pac. iso (1886).
"Greenville Gas Co. v. Reis, 54 Oh. St. 549, 44 N. E. 271 (1896); Gay

v. Y. M. C. C., 37 Utah 28o, 1o7 Pac. 237 (191o).
" North British M. I. Co. v. Union Stockyards Co., i2o Ky. 465, 87 S.
W. 285 (9o5)." Scott v. Chactaw Bk., 4 Ala. App. 648, 59 So. 184 (912) ; Wittenbrock

v. Parker, io2 Cal. 93, 36 Pac. 374 0894). Conversety one affected by notice
in one capacity (executor) is not affected, by that fact alone, personally:
Gorham v. Sayles, 23 R. I..44, so AtL 848 (1go1).
Compare: Wade, Notice, 2d Ed, Sec. 687. The following are a few
of the many cases reaching this result: Dresser v. Norwood, 17 Comm.
Bench, N. S. 466 (1866); Campbell v. First Nat. Bk., 22 Col. 77 (1896);

McClelland v. Saul, 113 Ia. --,o8, 84 N. W. o34 (190o); Underwood v. Fosha,
iso Pac. 571 (Kan. 19ts); Trentor v. Pothen, 46 Minn. 298, 49 N. W. 129
(1891), semble; Holden v. N. Y. & Erie Bk., 72 N. Y. 286 (1878); Deering
v. lolcomb, 26 Wash. 88, 67 Pac. 240 (19oi); Shafer v. Phoenix Ins. Co..
53 Wis. 361, 1o N. W. 38t (1881).
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rclcvant, nor those of which he had obtained knowledge through
confidential communications.
Fourth. Where the agent was committing -an independent
tort, though purporting to act for the principal, the latter is not
affected by the agent's knowledge, although merely an adverse
interest possessed by the agent does not affect the principal's
liability.
This last class of cases includes those where the agent
having a duty to disclose had an adverse interest It is said
very generally that "knowledge will not be imputed," because
of the assigned reason that the whole law of imputed notice
is based upon the presumption that the agent will reveal the
facts known to him in relation to which he has a duty to act
and that there can be no such presumption where he has an
adverse interest. But of course this reasoning is purely evasive.
If the presumption were one of fact, the principal could show
in any case that the agent did not communicate. The courts
evidently mean that the presumption is conclusive. A "conclusive presumption" that one has performed his duty means
that he is treated as if he had performed it and this is true
normally only against the one owing the duty. If the principal is affected, therefore, it is because he is made liable for
the fault of his agent. If he is so liable generally, a reason foi
excusing him must be found in the principles of agency. If
it were true that the adverse interest of a servant or agent relieves the principal for wrongs committed within the scope of
the employment, the fictitious phrasing would be subject to
criticism only as to its form. But in general the adverse interest of an agent does not of itself affect the responsibility of
the principal. Liability ceases only where the act was not performed by the actor qua agent or servant; where there were
no elements of representation in it.9 4
If there is a departure from this result in the cases dealing
with notice part of the blame may be put upon the use of
"Of course this limitation of liability exists only where there has
been no reliance upon the fact of agency.
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formulae.

But there are other reasons for a variation.

The

obligation to holders of previous equities is not so clear and
direct as the duty not to injure the property or person of another physically. The sphere of liability for physical damage
to tangible property has always been considerably larger than
that for injuries to intangible rights. Moreover the duties were
evolved in different courts and- the chancellor was in a better
position than were the common law judges to disregard the
fiction of the identity of principal and agent Where it would
be inequitable not to do so.- For these reasons, though the
results of the cases do not support the rule that "notice is not
imputed" where the agent has'an adverse interest, the liability
of the principal is, perhaps, not the same as it would have been
if evolved in strict conformity to the general principle of which
it is a part.
That it. is incorrect to say that an adverse interest on the
part -of the agent affects the liability of the principal is proved
by the cases, too nilmerous to need citation, holding to the contrary by necessary implication, where the principal is held to be
bound by the knowledge of an agent who receives compensation
based upon the successful completion of the transaction. There
is an obvious interest, here to conceal any information 'which
would prevent the earning of the compensation. With the elimination of the previously discussed cases where the "agent" was
merely a transferor and was not purporting to act as agent,
all the cases in which the principal has been held not bound by
the knowledge of an agent having an adverse interest have
been those where the agent was committing an act, which aside
from the non-disclosure of the facts, was a fraud upon the
principal or a third person. The agent, using the opportunity
afforded by his position, acted for his own individual ends. So,
as there is no reliance upon the fact of agency by the injured
person, the real measure of the act may be determined and
liability apportioned accordingly. If the agent was considering
principally and fraudulently his own interests, it is his personal act; if not, the existence of an adverse interest has no
effect upon the liability of the principal.
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There is some judicial sanction for this method of approach. Lord Chelmsford in Espin v. Pemberton,9" said: "I
would rather say that the commission of the fraud broke off
the relation of principal and agent, or was beyond the scope
of the authority and therefore it prevented the possibility of
imputing the knowledge to the principal." In Allen v. South
Boston Ry. Co.,96 Justice Field, referring to this statement says,
"It has been suggested that the true reason for the exception
is th~at an independent fraud committed by an agent is beyond
On this view such a
the scope of his employment. .
fraud bears some analogy to a tort wilfully committed by a
servant for his own purposes and not as a means of performing the business entrusted to him by his master." And, in
Gunster v. Scranton illuminating Heat & Power Co.: '7 "If
'it be urged, as in some cases, that the principal, having put the
agent in his place, should, as a matter of public policy, be held
answerable for all the latter does,'a sound answer is suggested
in Allen v. South Boston Ry. Co., that an independent fraud
committed by an agent on his own account is beyond the scope
of his employment and bears analogy to a tort wilfully committed by a servant for his own purposes and not as a means
of performing the business entrusted to him by his master."
Examples of the scope of this rule are found where an
agent is, unknown to his principal, acting for an adverse party
and is, therefore, committing a breach of duty which would be
sufficient to terminate the relationship.9 Also where the agent
induces the principal to purchase property or loan money, the
purpose of the agent being to derive a fraudulent advantage
a3 De G. & J. s47 (1859).
U 5o Mass. 200, 22 N. E. 917 (89).
See also Mechem, Agency, 2d Ed.,
Sec. 18j6.
"187 Pa. 327, 37 Atl. 550 (1897). The language of this case is quoted
with approval in Am. Nat. Bk. v. Ritz, 70 W. Va. 409, 74 S. F_. 679 (1912).
The application of the rule to the facts seems incorrect.
'Benton v. Minn. T. & M. Co., 73 Minn. 498, 76 N. W. 265 (j898);
Burton v. Palm, 9 S. Ur. 18z (Tex. i888).
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out of the money so paid. 9 Even more clearly, it appears that
the principal is not treated as if having knowledge of the very
fraud which is being perpetrated upon him, as where it is
sought to affect a bank with the knowledge of an officer that
it was insolvent, the officer with knowledge being the one who,
in defaulting, created the insolvency.1 00 Equally without reason is the effort to hold one upon the ground of estoppel for
acts done by an agent in excess of authority, where he alone
knows the facts, or the facts are known only by a fellow conspirator who profits from the wrongdoing. 0 1
In another large group of cases, in some of which it might
be difficult to apply the rule suggested here, the action is brought
or defended by one who colluded with the agent to keep the
knowledge from the principal. There is an obvious reason for
not subjecting the principal to liability in favor of one who
has been a cause in producing the injury and the "knowledge
is not imputed" to the principal to prevent him from recovering upon an obligation or retaining property.10 2 This is true
although there was no thought of fraud against him in the
concealmenLe 0s
The cases involving suretyship bonds may be put upon special grounds for there is first to be interpreted the contract.
It may well be that a corporation in whose favor the bond runs
"Kennedy v. Green, 3 Mk. & K. 699 (1834), semble; Dillaway v.
Butler, i35 Mass. 479 (1883); Camden S. D. & T. Co. v. Lord, 67 N. J. Eq.
489, 58 Atl. 607 (1904); New York v. Tenth Nat. Bk., ini N. Y. 446, i8
N. E. 618 (i888); Benedict v. Arnoux, 154 N. Y. 715, 49 N. E. 326 (i898);
Brooklyn Dist. Co. v. Standard D. & D. Co.,. 193 N. Y. si, 86 N. E. 564
(i98) ; Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co, 93 Wis. 153, 66 N. W. 518 (1896).
" Perth Amboy G. Co. v. Bk., 60 N. J. Eq. 84, 45 AtL 704 (19oo).
'"Watkins Salt Co. v. Mulkey, 225 Fed. 739 (1915); Merchants' Nat. Bk.
v. Nichols, 223 111. 41, 79 N. E. 38 (i96); Houghton v. Todd, 58 Neb. 36o, 73
N. W. 634 (1899); Clement v. Young McS. A. Co, 7o N. J. Eq. 677, 67
Atl. 82 (i9O6) ; In Re Millward C. C. Co., 161 Pa. i57, 28 Atl. io72 (1894).
"State Say. Bk. v. Montgomery, L. Ii. 4 Ch. 35 (1868); Schutz v.
Jordan, 141 U. S. 213 (189i); Waite v. Santa Cruz, 89 Fed. P. 61, aff. i84.
U. S. 302 (z898); Allen v. McCullough, 99 Ala. 612, 12 So. 81o (I893);
Merchants' Nat. Bk. v. Demere, 92 Ga. 735, 19 S. F. 38 ("1894); Findley
v. Cowles, 93 Ia. 389, 61 N. W. 998 (1895); Cowan v. Curran, 26 IlL 58,
s Pac.
75 N. E. 322 (i9o5); St. Bk. of Moore v. Forsyth, 41 Mont. 24

914 (gigo); Morrill v. Bosley, 4o Tex. Civ. App. 7, 88 S. W. 51g (r9o5).
'0Trader's and T. Bk. v. Black, io8 Va. 59, 6o S. E. 743 (igo8).
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does not guarantee the fidelity of its employees in reporting the
defalcations of others, as that would cause it to lose the -protection which it wishes to have.104 But where it is assumed
that the employer is responsible for some failures of his employees to notify him, the distinction is drawn between the
situation where the ones failing to report were in collusion with
the one defaulting, in which case the principal is not bound,10 5
and that where the failure of the employee was due to some
cause other than conspiracy against the principal, in which case
he is liable 10 8
Finally, the principal may be liable for his own fault in the
selection of an agent where the principal "studiously refrains"
from acquiring the knowledge which would prevent his being
a bona fide purchaser, or where he employs one whom he knows
to be unreliable or one who probably will not reveal the pertinent facts. He is held because of his own carelessness or wrongdoing. This explains many of the English cases which, otherwise, would seem to be at variance with the American decisions. "If a mortgagee is imprudent enough to entrust his
interests to the mortgagor, being a solicitor, he may do so and
take all the consequences.' 0 7 In Lc Neve v. Le Neve, 108 where
the solicitor was acting for a husband in a settlement and also
for the wife, the latter was held bound by the solicitor's knowledge that the husband's action was in fraud of another. So in
0
where the purchaser employed the seller
Boursot v.Savage,"'
as solicitor in the transaction, it was held that he took subject
to the equities of the solicitor's cestui que trust. This point is
well brought out in the case of Pine Mountain Iron & Coal Co.
'" Fidelity & Dep. Co. v. Courtney, i86 U. S. 342 (1902).
'Am. Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133 (i898); Saint v. Wheeler
W. M. Co., 9 Ala. 367, 10 So. 539 (1892); Van Buren Cty. v. Am. Surety
Co., 137 la. 490, 115 N. W. 24 (i9O8).
"Guaranty Co. v. Mechanics Say. Bk., 183 U. S. 402 (i9o2); Minor
v. Mechanics Bk., x Pet. 46 (1828); Franklin Bk. v. Cooper, 36 Me. 179
(1853).
.0°
Lord Chelmsford in Espin v. Pemberton, 3 De G. & J. 557 (859).
' 0 'Amb. 436 (1747).
" L. R. 2 Eq. 134 (1866).
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v. Bailey."' In this case the buyer's agent acted also as agent
for the seller, this being known to both parties. During this
period of the transaction, as the court said, the buyer was affected
by any knowledge held by the agent in regard to the seller's
title, which it was the agent's duty to reveal."' But as the agent
afterwards had secretly bought the property and sold it to the
principal while pretending to act as agent for the seller and his
principal, his action was fraudulent, aside from the fact of nondisclosure of the equities. At the time the principal bought the
property, then, the agent was acting wholly for himself, and that
being the time when the obligation to communicate the facts
arose, the principal was not bound by a knowledge of them.
Summarizing the results of the cases as they appear to
the writer: i.Where one bases his rights upon the giving of
notice to another, the notice must be given to one, who, at that
time, was authorized or held out as authorized to act for that
other for the purpose of receiving notice. If this is done it
is immaterial whether or not the agent was perpetrating a fraud
upon the principal unless this was known to the one giving
the notice. 2. Where the right is based upon the possession of
knowledge of another, some fault in that other or his agent
must be shown. If the agent having the knowledge was the
one through whose act the principal claims, the latter is bound
irrespective of the method of the acquisition of the knowledge
or of any unloyal frame of mind on the part of the agent
(Quaere, upon authority). If the principal acquires the title
independently of the act of the agent with knowledge, but the
latter has an obligation to divulge or to act in reference to it,
the principal is bound if the agent negligently or wilfully fails
to perform his duty, unless such failure was a consciously
wrongful act not done for the purpose of performing the duties

"94 Fed. 258 (1899).
=Accord: Witter v. McCarthy Co., II Cal. XVII, 40 Pac. 969 (1896);
Win. Berganthal Co. v. Bk., 102 Minn. ;38, 112 N. W. 892 (i9o7); Blackwell v. Britt A. M. Co., 65 S. C. 1os, 43 S. E. 395 (i9o2). But see: Randolph v. Ballard Cty. Bk., 142 Ky. x45, x34 S. W. 165 (zgux).
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of agent. But even in the latter case, as in all others, the
principal is liable if he personally is at fault. Where neither
he nor his agent is at fault, there is no liability and no "imputed knowledge."
III. NOTICE TO AN AGENT THROUGH HIS PRINCIPAL.
Although only incidentally relevant to the questions under
discussion, it may not be amiss to consider briefly some of the
conclusions reached by Mr. Edwin H. Abbott in an article in
the .HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1: 2 as the questions raised therc
seem susceptible to the foregoing analysis. Mr. Abbott
argued that, as a corporation obviously has what may be considered the equivalent of knowledge of all facts as to which
a memorandum is entered upon its records, where an agent
acts for it, the corporate principal should be subjected to liability as if the agent knew the facts. To reach this conclusion,
it seemed to be necessary to disagree with the opinion in Cornfoote v. Fowke.113 In that case, an agent, in making an agreement to lease a house, innocently misrepresented that there were
no objectionable features. His principal knew that there was
an adjacent brothel, but the court held that his knowledge was
not a defence in an action brought by him upon the agreement
to lease. Though we may agree that the other party should
have the right to withdraw from the agreement upon learning
the facts,11 the court's reasoning that there was not fraud of
any sort, in the absence of a conscious concealment on the part
of the principal, is sound. If knowledge- is imputed because of
the identity of principal and agent, we would be driven -to'
Justice Holmes' explanation that the court balked at the manifest absurdity of extending the identification to this extent...5
"t

Vol. 26, p. 237.

u16 M. & W. 358 (Eng. i84o).
See Pollock, Torts, 9th Ed., p.
Common Law, p. 23.
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If, however, "imputed knowledge" is but a method of indicating a principal's liability when some one has been at fault, the
representation of an innocent agent cannot be added to the
knowledge of an innocent principal to create "imputed fraud."
To illustrate by a case that avoids the specific difficulties
of Cornfoote v. Fowke, but which serves to illustrate the principle. Smith gives to his agent, Jones, a general authority to
buy and sell registered cattle. In pursuance of this authority,
Jones buys from X and later sells to Y a cow which in fact
has a defect and in which Robinson had an equity. Smith, the
principal, knew these facts in regard to the cow at the time of
the purchase and sale but did not know that his agent had dealt
with this particular animal. Unless Smith had some reason to
suppose that the animal would be purchased for him, is there
any rational ground for holding that the rights of the purchaser Y would be incrfeased by Smith's knowledge; or that
Robinson's equity would not be extinguished at the time of
purchase; or that Smith's knowledge would prevent him from
bringing an action for deceit against X if the other elements of
deceit were present? Of course if there was either carelessness
or intentional concealment of the facts from the agent, this
assuming that a knowledge of the facts ought to have been disclosed, Smith would have been at fault as to Robinson and
as to Y. So was an insurer who after learning that a ship,
which he had instructed his agent to insure, was destroyed,
failed to notify the agent." 16 But unless there can be found a
duty to communicate and a breach of that duty, there is no
ground for imposing liability, aside from the pure fiction of
the identity of principal and agent. Cornfoote .v. Fou'ke is of
course clearly distinguishable from the cases where "absolute
notice" was given to the principal. In cases of that type the
principal is bound by the knowledge as soon as the act of giving notice has been completed and it is immaterial after that
whether he acts individually or through an agent. The quesueMcLanahan v. Uni. ins. Co., z Pet. 170 (1828); Ludgate v. Love,

44 L. T. (N. S.) 694 (C. A. x88i), cited by Mr. Abbott, is of this type.
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tion of knowledge is immaterial. In three of the American
cases cited by Mr. Abbott as contra in principle to Cornfoote
v. Fowke, a cestui que trust or a lienholder of a creditor had
given notice to an agent of a debtor corporation of his interest
in the chose in action." 7 In all of them, other agents who did
not know the facts made the .payments to the original creditor
and the payment was not held good. In all of these we find
notice of the "absolute" type; 118 upon its being given, the
rights of the parties crystalized into a distinct obligation on
the p rt of the debtor to pay subject only to the notice. Moreover, aside from this, it is clear that there was a breach of
duty on the part of the ones receiving the notice in failing to
inform all other agents who at any time would have authority
to act in the matter. This point is brought out in the fourth
American case cited." 9 These decisions, then are not opposed
to the fundamental reasoning in (ornfoote v. Fowke.
Briefly, when an agent acts without knowledge, a principal
should be liable as though the agent had the knowledge when:
first, "absolute notice" has been given; secondly, there is an
obligation upon the principal to inform the agent 120 or a duty
upon the agent to inform himself, from the records of his principal or otherwise. To extend the principal's liability beyond
this point is to accept at their face value the fictions found necessary by the courts in the development of principles and to refuse
to accept the principles on which they are based,.
Warren A. Seavey.
Indiana University.
..Mechanics' Bk. v. Seton, i Pet. 2W (z828); Curtice v. Crawford Cty.'
Bk., ni8 Fed. (:go2); Elliott v. Trust Co., 189 Mass. 542, 75 N. E. 944
(9os).
11This is true also in the English cases cited:
Mayhew v. Eames, i
Car. & P. 350 (1825); Willis v. Bk. of England, 4 Ad. & F. 21 (1835).
"'Gibson v. Nat. Park Bk., 98 N. Y. 87 (1885), where there was an
attachment of a chose in action by service of process upon the debtor.
"When the officers of this bank had notice of the service of the attaclhmnt,
it was their duty to take immediate steps to impound the funds in their
hands, and prevent their payment by any of its agents, except to a bona
fide holder of its obligation."
'Upon this ground, with an appropriate plea, the defendant should have
succeeded in Corfoote v. Fowke.

